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1. Introduction
The auto industry is clearly important to the overall world economy and it has been a
source of many innovations in manufacturing technology (e.g., the assembly line, just-in-
time inventory, kan-ban, etc.) and product design. As a result, it has been the subject of
numerous empirical studies. However, most of these studies have been centered on analyzing
the production and procurement processes (e.g., Lieberman et al. (1990) and Lieberman and
Asaba (1997)) or the new product development process (e.g., Clark and Fujimoto (1989)).
Little attention has been placed on the management of the nished goods from the assembly
plant down to the consumer, which is the focus of this paper.
Figure 1 displays times series of the days-of-supply (end of month inventory divided by
the average daily sales rate on the following two months) for three auto manufacturers
Ford, General Motors (GM) and Toyotabetween 1995 and 2004. This measure of inven-
tory performance includes all nished goods inventory destined for sale in the U.S. market
and physically in North America: inventory on factory lots, at ports of entry, in-transit to
dealerships and at dealerships. The gure reveals striking di¤erences among the di¤erent
makes. Although on average the makes hold about 60 days-of-supply (which is often sug-
gested in the trade press as the idealinventory level, Harris (2004)), Toyota consistently
holds less than that benchmark while GM and Ford hold more than that benchmark in the
majority of the sample. Furthermore, none of the companies exhibit a trend in inventory
during this time period, which suggests that these di¤erences are persistent1. Our objective
in this study is to measure the e¤ect of several factors that could explain the di¤erences in
inventory observed in the industry.
Based on analytical models and empirical studies in the operations management litera-
ture, we identify numerous factors that could inuence a rms optimal inventory decision.
These factors can be roughly group into four categories: demand fragmentation, sales char-
acteristics, production characteristics and competition. Demand fragmentation refers to
the allocation of demand across di¤erent products (i.e., vehicle models), or across di¤er-
ent options of a given product or across di¤erent geographic locations (e.g., dealerships).
Each of these forms of fragmentation can lead to more variable demand and therefore more
1We regressed days-of-supply on a linear time trend and monthly dummies assuming AR(1) errors. Our
analysis suggests that only ve of the fteen manufacturers exhibit a trend. Among the six major manu-
facturers, only Nissan exhibits a (negative) trend. Porsche and Isuzu are the only manufacturers that have
trends in nominal inventories (both positive).
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inventory. For sales characteristics we focus on sales trends and seasonality. Production
characteristics refer to a rms manufacturing capabilities and production schedule. For
example, a more exible plant can adjust its production more readily and therefore can
better match its production to its sales. Hence, a more exible plant could enable a rm
to hold lower safety stocks. Furthermore, holding a plants production exibility constant,
inventory should increase when the plant is required to produce a greater variety of products,
due to switching times between products. Competition refers to the amount of competition
a rm faces for its products. We conjecture this can inuence a rms inventory in at least
two ways: (1) competition should reduce a products margin, which leads to lower inventory;
and/or (2) competition gives consumers more choices, which leads to higher inventory - when
a consumer has choices it is important to have in stock a product that closely matches the
consumers preference, otherwise the consumer is more likely to substitute to a competitors
product. Although theory enables us to identify these various factors, an empirical study
is needed to evaluate their relative importance (at least for our focus industry and market,
U.S. autos).
The next section reviews the related literature. Section 3 gives a brief introduction to
the industry and section 4 describes the data used. Section 5 describes the factors included
in our econometric model and the estimation methods. Section 6 provides our estimation
results and sensitivity analysis. Section 7 discusses our main conclusions and future related
work.
2. Literature Review
Most studies of operational performance in the auto industry have focused within the as-
sembly plant or on the product design process rather than nished goods in the downstream
supply chain. For example, Fisher and Ittner (1999) measure the e¤ect of product va-
riety on work-in-process inventory using archival data from automotive plants of a single
company. MacDu¢ e et al. (1996) analyze the impact of product variety on manufactur-
ing productivity and consumer-perceived quality using data from 70 auto assembly plants.
Lieberman et al. (1990) analyze drivers of productivity growth across rms in the auto indus-
try, which includes labor, capital and total factor productivity. Lieberman and Demeester
(1999) demonstrate that reductions in work-in-progress inventory can lead to productivity
gains, which is a causal relationship that is econometrically challenging to identify due to
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the feedback between the two variables. Lieberman and Asaba (1997) report interesting
di¤erences regarding inventory performance across the supply chains of Japanese and U.S.
auto manufacturers, but they exclude nished goods inventory from the analysis. Clark and
Fujimoto (1989) study the e¤ect of several product and project characteristics and organi-
zational capabilities on new product development leadtimes. Bresnahan and Ramey (1994)
and Hall (2000) provide evidence of signicant adjustment costs in the production rate at
auto plants, leading manufacturers to have intermittent plant closings to match supply with
demand. Goyal et al. (2006) study factors that inuence the adoption of exible production
technology by U.S. auto manufacturers. We add to this stream of research by linking other
factors associated with production and scheduling that are associated with nished-goods
inventory.
Several papers explore inventory at the industry level with a focus on either the long
run trend in inventory (e.g., Wu et al. (2005) and Rajagopalan and Malhotra (2001)) or the
volatility of production relative to sales (e.g., Cachon et al. (2007)) - we do not consider either
of those issues in our study. There is a growing literature that explores rm level inventory
rather than at the product/model level as we do. For example, Gaur et al. (2005), use panel
data from quarterly nancial reports of retailers to nd that inventory turnover is negatively
related to a retailers capital intensity and positively related to the retailers gross margin
and a proxy for sales forecast errors. We focus on nished-goods inventory performance over
a larger section of the supply chain (assembly plant down to retailer/dealer) and because we
concentrate on one product category (automobiles), we are able to obtained more detailed
data on other factors that inuence inventory performance. Rumyantsev and Netessine
(2007) use aggregate inventory data of public U.S. companies to measure the relationship
between demand uncertainty, lead times, gross margins and rm size on inventory levels. We
include similar covariates in our study. Hendricks and Singhal (2005), Wu et al. (2005), Lai
(2006) and Randall et al. (2006) study the relationship between inventory and rm nancial
performance measures, but we do not consider such measures (again, because our unit of
analysis is the product/model level rather than the company level).
3. The U.S. Automotive Industry
In this section we provide a brief description of some idiosyncratic features of the U.S. auto
industry that are important for our study. Six companies account for about 90% of sales in
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the U.S. auto market: Chrysler, Ford, General Motors (GM), Honda, Nissan and Toyota.2
More than 90% of U.S. sales for Chrysler, Ford and GM is produced in the U.S., Canada and
Mexico. We refer to vehicles produced in (outside) North America as domestic (imported).
Toyota and Honda produce about 50% of their U.S. sales domestically, while 65% of Nissans
vehicles are domestic. Some companies, e.g. Hyundai and Porsche, satised all of their U.S.
sales with imported production during our study period.
There are di¤erent levels of aggregation at which one can describe product variety in
the auto industry. Each company o¤ers vehicles under several brands or auto makes. For
example, GM makes include Chevrolet, GMC and Pontiac, among others; Toyota makes
are Toyota division (hereafter Toyota), Lexus and Scion. Each auto make produces several
auto models. Examples of models include the Chevrolet Cavalier, the Toyota Camry and
the Ford Explorer. Models can be classied into vehicle types, which include cars, sport
cars, sport utility vehicles, pickups, minivans, etc. A platform is often used to describe
commonality among models at the production level. For example, the Harbour Report
(2004, pg. 229) denes a platform as the welded or framed underbody a car is built and rides
onand designates that the Chevrolet Cavalier and the Pontiac Sunre are built on the same
platform. Consumers purchase models with di¤erent options, which include di¤erent body
styles, engines, transmission types, safety features (e.g., side airbags, automatic breaking
system) and other accessories.
Automobile assembly plants consist of one or more assembly lines that are designed to
produce in large scale a particular vehicle specication with a limited range of options.
Opening a new assembly plant requires signicant capital investment and assembly lines
are designed to operate at a particular line rate (vehicles per hour). As a result, in the
short-run, a manufacturers primary option for adjusting production is either to add or to
subtract shifts (Bresnahan and Ramey (1994)).
Franchise laws regulate new vehicle sales in the U.S. and all new vehicles must be sold
through a network of dedicated franchised dealers. In the U.S. most vehicles are pur-
chased directly from dealership inventory3. Furthermore, dealerships do not order inventory
like retailers in most other industries, but rather manufacturers implement a push system
that allocates inventory to dealerships after production (e.g., Cachon and Lariviere (1999)).
2Chrysler merged with Daimler-Benz in 1998, changing its name to Daimler-Chrysler, but we continue
to refer to the company throughout as Chrysler.
3Marti (2000) reports that only 15-20% of buyers buy custom cars from manufacturers.
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Hence, we study the performance of all nished goods inventory in the supply chain from
the assembly plant down to the dealership.
4. Data
We collected data, covering the years 1996 through 2004, from three main secondary sources:
Automotive News, Wards Auto and Harbour Report. From Wards Auto, we obtained
monthly end-of-the-month inventory and sales by model. Inventory includes all nished
automobiles in North America destined for sale in the U.S. market: inventory on factory
lots and ports of entry, inventory in-transit to dealerships and inventory at dealerships 4 We
also obtained (i) model specications and list prices for all cars and light-trucks (pickups,
vans and SUVs) available by year, (ii) monthly domestic production of each model by plant,
and (iii) the platform designations of each model. From Automotive News we obtained data
on (i) the number of dealerships by auto make by year, (ii) survey data on gross prots of
dealerships by auto make by year, and (iii) model specications which were used to complete
and cross validate the data published by Wards. We also obtained data on plant stoppages
from the weekly periodicals of Automotive News.
From The Harbour Report we obtained data on a selection of assembly plants in North
America. Several plants have more than one production line and the data is reported sepa-
rately for each line. In those cases we refer to each production line as a distinct plant. The
data include total production, line rate capacity and the number of platforms produced by
plant by year.5 We also have data on the models that were produced at each plant. Harbour
includes data for all Chrysler, Ford and GM plants, with the exception of Chryslers Conner
Avenue plant. The Harbour Report does not include plants from BMW, Mercedes, Subaru,
Volkswagen and Volvo. The plants in the Harbour Report cover 90% of total domestic pro-
duction during year 1996 through 2004. Coverage is excellent for Chrysler, Ford and GM
but somewhat lower for Toyota and Honda due to the exclusion of some of their plants6.
In addition to these data, we obtained some economic data, such as the price of gasoline,
consumer price indexes, number of households in the U.S. and personal income data. These
4Exports are a small fraction of U.S. production and are often shipped as parts, therefore not counted as
nished vehicles. GM changed its inventory counting scheme during the study period, reporting dealership
inventory only. We included dummy variables to control for this change in our econometric study.
5For three plants, the number of platforms is provided for the plant and not for each production line. All
our results are robust to the exclusion of these plants.
6Tables A1 and A2 in the online appendix describes in more detail the plants included in the The Harbour
Report.
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were obtained from the Current Population Survey, Energy Information Administration and
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We collected data from Consumer Reports for our
sensitivity analysis.
We excluded some data in our econometric analysis. The Chevrolet Lumina was phased-
out in years 2000-2001 and sold only to rental companies, so we chose to exclude it. We
also excluded the Chevrolet Metro in 2001 (its last year of production) and the Saturn EV1
(an electric vehicle), both of which had a days-of-supply greater than 600 (more than 20
standard deviations above the mean). We excluded the Ford Excursion in 2000 because its
plant utilization was more than 5 standard deviations above the mean. GM Oldsmobile
and Suzuki had the largest variation in the number of dealerships during the study period.
GM announced the closing of Oldsmobile in 2000 and the last model was produced in 2004
(the number of dealerships was reduced from 2990 to 1337). Suzuki experience the opposite
change in its dealership structure - it expanded from 290 dealers in 1995 to 543 in 2005.
We chose a conservative approach and excluded from our main results observations from
Oldsmobile from 2000-2004 and all Suzuki observations because these dramatic changes in
the dealership structure could be correlated with other factors that a¤ect inventory (e.g.,
such as closing a brand or building a brand).7 We also excluded full sized vans and pickups
from our analysis because models in these segments tend to exhibit huge option variety
(e.g. Ford F-Series has an average of 280 options o¤ered per year). As we show later, our
estimation requires data from assembly plants, so our sample only includes models produced
at plants covered by the Harbour Report.
5. Econometric Specication
This section describes the measures used in our study, our hypotheses and the estimation of
our empirical model.
We use i to index vehicle models (hereon models) and t to index calendar years (hereon
years). The dependent variable is the log of the average monthly days-of-supply, DSit; of
each model in each year, where days-of-supply in a month equals the inventory at the end of
the month divided by the average daily sales rate in the following two months. Specically,
for models that were sold in each month of a year,
7Section 6.1 shows some results when these makes are included.
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DSit =
1
12
12X
m=1
 
IitmPm+2
k=m+1 Sitk
!
;
where Iitm is end-of-month inventory (in units) in month m and Sitm is sales (in units) in
month m: (Naturally, months 13 and 14 in year t are actually months 1 and 2 in year
t+ 1:) If a model was sold for part of a year, we average the days-of-supply from only those
months. Finally, the average days-of-supply does not include the last two months a model
is sold. We use a forward looking assessment of the sales rate (two months ahead) because
we expect that inventory is held in anticipation of future demand rather than in reaction to
past demand, especially when demand exhibits known seasonal patterns. Our results are
robust to alternative measures of days-of-supply.8 A log transformation is consistent with
previous studies (e.g., Gaur et al. (2005)), but we report in section 6.1 results without a log
transformation.
The independent variables are divided into two groups: measures associated with indi-
vidual models, denoted by the (column) vector Xit and measures attributed to the plant
producing a model, p(i); denoted by the (column) vector Wp(i)t. The third group in our
model is an error term, uit; that captures unobserved factors and other random uctuations
a¤ecting DS. Thus, the econometric model is dened as:
DSit = Xit + Wp(i)t + uit , (1)
where  and  are row vector parameters to be estimated. Like DS, all variables in X and
W are included with log transformation. We next detail the particular measures included
in X and W: Subsequently, we divide uit into additional components. As mentioned in
the introduction, our measures can linked to factors from four broad (and not necessar-
ily mutually exclusive) categories: demand fragmentation, sales characteristics, production
characteristics and competition.
Three of the factors included inXit are related to various forms of demand fragmentation:
SALESit; OPTIONSit; and DEALERS it: SALESit is the average monthly sales (in units) of
model i during year t (again, only including months for which the model was sold): as a brand
adds models to its assortment it may reduce the annual sales per model as its aggregate sales
become fragmented over its wider product o¤ering. OPTIONSit is the number of options
8We considered three other methods for evaluating the sales rate in the denominator of the days-of-
supply ratio: (1) the average sales in the following month only; (2) the average sales rate in the following
three months; and (3) sales in the same month inventory is measured. Our results with these measures were
similar, but the estimates were less precise in particular when DS was calculated using the third option.
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o¤ered for model i in year t, where an increase in a models options may be associated with
fragmenting its inventory into units that are not perfect substitutes. The denition of these
options are relatively standard, so it is possible to make comparisons of option intensity across
models and years.9 Finally, DEALERS it is the number of dealerships in year t of model is
brand: all else equal, an increase in the number of dealerships fragments sales among more
physical locations. If there are economies of scale associated with inventory and production,
then we expect that DS should be decreasing in SALES: models with a higher sales volume
may require proportionally less inventory. (For example, it is well known that the EOQmodel
exhibits economies of scale - doubling demand increases inventory by less than a factor of
2.) Similarly, DS should be increasing in OPTIONS and DEALERS :10 Furthermore, an
increase in DEALERS is likely to increase the competition faced by a brands dealerships,
both intra and inter-brand competition. Theory is ambiguous with respect to the impact of
competition on DS; but there is some evidence that in isolated markets there is a positive
association between the level of competition and DS (see Olivares and Cachon (2007) for
details).
In addition to the nominal level of sales, Xit includes covariates capturing sales trends.
Production capacity can be costly to adjust in the short run, so changes in sales from year to
year may lead to deviations from target inventory levels. For example, we expect a models
DS decreases when sales increase from one year to the next as production capacity may lag
the sales growth. Alternatively, a model with increasing sales may be a popular product
and therefore require less inventory. To explain, when a consumer does not nd her most
preferred product, she can choose not to purchase anything, thereby causing a "lost sale",
or choose to wait for the product to become available (i.e., backorder) or purchase another
product in the assortment. A consumer will be more patient with a more popular/well
designed product (i.e., more likely to backorder rather than choose the lost-sales option).
Therefore, a rm with a popular product can rationally choose to carry less inventory. We
cannot directly observe a models popularity (our catch-all phrase for the propensity of
consumers to wait to purchase an item rather than substitute), but we suspect it may be
associated with several of our measures, as we will discuss.
9Kekre and Srinivasan (1990) uses cross-sectional survey data from di¤erent industries to estimate the
e¤ect of product variety on inventory, but nds no signicant impact. Measuring di¤erences in product
variety across industries is challenging and could be causing this negative result. By focusing on the auto
industry, we are able to use more detailed and objective measures of product variety.
10For example, fragmenting demand may increase the coe¢ cient of variation of demand (as assumed by
van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999)), thereby requiring more inventory to achieve the same target service level.
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Continuing with the issue of sales trends, we include in Xit the following two measures:
STREND+it = max
 
(SALESit   SALESit 1)+; 1

(2a)
STREND it = max
 
(SALESit 1   SALESit)+; 1

; (2b)
where x+ denotes max(x; 0): (These measures are never less than 1, which ensures that we
can apply a log transformation to each of them.) We expect DS is decreasing in STREND+
(either because of production reasons or because of model popularity) and, naturally, DS
should be increasing in STREND . We include two measures to allow for di¤erent reactions
to sales increases and decreases.11
Sales in the auto industry exhibit varying degrees of seasonality, which motivates a pro-
duction smoothing strategy when it is costly to change the level of production - produce
at a reasonably constant level, build up inventory during slow sales periods and draw down
inventory during sales peaks. As a result, we expect that DS is increasing in the degree
of seasonality - the more seasonal sales are, all else being equal, the more inventory a rm
rationally carries. Alternatively, sales seasonality could be a proxy for model popularity.
A popular product may not exhibit strong seasonal markdown patterns (i.e., discount rou-
tinely o¤ered at the same time of the year) and therefore a popular product may exhibit less
seasonality. Consequently, DS may increase with seasonality because a seasonal product is
unpopular, thereby requiring more inventory to avoid lost sales.
To measure seasonality, with each sales-time series, we t a regression with model-specic
monthly dummies, denoted dim, m 2 f1; :::; 12g: Our seasonality measure for model i is
SEASONi =
p
V (dim)=E (Sitm) ; (3)
where V () denotes the sample variance, and E() the sample mean.
As we have already discussed, a models popularity may be associated with a sales trend
or sales seasonality. We believe there can be other factors associated with a models popu-
larity. For example, the number of models within a segment may be a measure of product
substitution. As more models are added to a segment, they become closer to each other
11Our sales trend measures begin in 1996 because our sales data begins in 1995. Some new models were
introduced during our study period. Usually, sales of a new model start in the second half of the year
previous to the model-year of introduction. For example, the Cadillac Escalade was launched in model-year
1999, but sales for this model started on October of 1998. For this model, STREND is calculated for 1999
as the di¤erence in average monthly sales between 1999 and 1998. Similar calculations were used for the
other new models. Excluding models in their year of introduction does not change our main results.
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in a product attribute space. Consequently, consumers will be less likely to wait if their
preferred model is out of stock because their second choice becomes a more attractive alter-
native. Therefore, we include in Xit the number of models in the same segment as model i
in year t; NMKT it; as a measure of product substitution and competition. We expect that
DS is increasing in NMKT :
Next, model popularity may be correlated with a models cost markup (a models gross
margin divided by its marginal cost) - a rm can rationally support a higher cost markup with
a popular product. Alternatively, a rm may carry more inventory of a product with a high
markup because the consequence of a lost sale is greater - a stockout can be costlier with a
high gross margin product than a low gross margin product. Hence, the association between
cost markup and inventory is ambiguousthe direct e¤ect on the cost of lost sales tends to
increase inventory as markups increase, but the indirect e¤ect of model popularity tends to
decrease inventories. We are not able to observe COSTMK it; the cost markups for model i in
year t, so, following Berry et al. (1995), we estimate the cost markups for each model using a
structural model of oligopoly price competition in a di¤erentiated product market. In short,
this methodology estimates the cross-price elasticities among all products o¤ered during a
year, and computes equilibrium markups based on competitive pricing under the estimated
demand system. Details of the implementation are described in the online appendix12.
Finally, we include in Xit a measure of production exibility. We do not observe produc-
tion exibility directly, so we seek to observe the application of exibility. In particular, if
a model is manufactured in a exible plant, then we conjecture the plant is able to produce
in small batches, switch production between models without substantial downtime periods
and/or possibly increase or decrease production by adding or subtracting shifts and/or over-
time. As a result, production in a exible plant should track sales more closely relative
to an inexible plant. Therefore, we proxy production exibility by the average absolute
di¤erence between production and sales, normalized by sales volume,
PSit =
E (jPitm   Sitmj)
E (Sitm)
=
E (jIitm   Iitm 1j)
E (Sitm)
, (4)
where P is the production series, and the equation above follows from inventory balance
(i.e., the change in inventory equals the di¤erence between production and sales).13 Con-
sistent with our assertion that inventory volatility (i.e., a higher PS measure) proxies for
12We use part of the computer code developed by Nevo (2000) to do the estimation.
13We use the inventory series rather than the production and sales series because some of North American
production is not sold in the U.S., especially for plants in Mexico. As a result, the production series (for all
10
production exibility, we found a positive correlation between the PS of models produced at
the same plant (0.32). To explain further, consider the typical saw-tooth inventory pattern
implied by a (Q; r) inventory policy (e.g. Nahmias (2005), pg. 251). Inventory depends
both on the level of safety stock (the amount of inventory at the inventory troughs) as well
as on the size of the batches. An inexible production process produces in large batches
and therefore exhibits more inventory volatility. Furthermore, there need not be a mechan-
ical, or one-to-one, relationship between the average inventory level (DS) and the amount
of inventory volatility (PS)two products can have the same average inventory level but
di¤erent inventory volatilities, or two products can have the same inventory volatility (batch
size) but di¤erent average inventory levels (because they carry di¤erent safety stock levels).
Nevertheless, we expect that PS has a positive e¤ect on DS all else being equal, a rm
with lower inventory volatility carries less inventory.
Now consider Wp(i)t; which includes characteristics of the plants that produce model i:
To account for the time to switch between producing di¤erent models, NPLATF p(i);t is the
number of platforms (as dened by the Harbour Report) produced at plant p(i) in year t:
For models that were produced at more than one plant during the same year, p (i) denotes
a weighted average plant, calculated with production quantities as weights. We expect
NPLATF to have a positive e¤ect on DS, due to production switching times.14 A measure
of capacity utilization, UTIL; is also included in Wp(i)t: We calculated UTIL assuming a
constant per hour production rate of the plant during the year (using Harbours line rate
measure), three 8-hour shifts and 365 days per year: Theory is ambiguous on the e¤ect of
UTIL on inventory performance.15
The third group in (1) is the error term, which we decompose into di¤erent random
components:
uit = i + !p(i) +  t + 
m
it + 
w
p(i)t . (5)
The random components i and !p(i) represent time-invariant unobserved factors related to
of North America) and the sales series may not balance with the inventory series (for just the U.S. market).
Because we are studying the U.S. supply chain, we prefer to base our measure of exibility on the changes
in U.S. inventory.
14For example, in an economic lot scheduling problem with cyclic schedules, adding platforms to a pro-
duction process requires an increase in the production batches, which leads to higher inventory.
15In a make-to-stock queuing model an increase in utilization increases a products lead time, which can
increase the inventory needed to maintain a target service level. This suggests a positive relationship between
UTIL and DS: However, consider a cyclic production schedule with multiple products and switching times
between products. If there is a minimum production quantity (e.g., one shift), then there can be a negative
relationship between UTIL and DS:
11
model i and plant p (i) where the model is produced, respectively. The term  t represents
time shocks that a¤ect inventory performance industry-wide (such as economic trends) and
mit and 
w
p(i)t represent other idiosyncratic shocks which are model-year or plant-year specic.
Potential unobserved factors in i include model popularity, while factors in mit could include
changes in model popularity across time. Factors in !p(i) could include unobserved di¤erences
in manufacturing exibility (including switching times) and wp(i)t may include unobserved
changes in plant capabilities across time. To simplify some notation, denote it = mit + 
w
p(i)t.
Figure 2 summarizes the theoretical factors that a¤ect days-of-supply. Table 1 summa-
rizes the covariates used to measure some of these theoretical factors. In the table, a negative
sign (-) before the variable name indicates an inverse relationship between the theoretical
factor and the variable (e.g., higher PS implies lower production exibility).
We now discuss the estimation of the econometric model, (1). A primary concern is that
several of the factors included in (1) may be endogenous, i.e., controlled, at least in part,
by the manufacturers (e.g., the number of platforms produced at a plant). Because we do
not observe all factors that a¤ect inventory decisions, some of the endogenous variables in
X and W can be correlated with the error term u. In such a situation, OLS can lead
to biased estimates of  and  in (1). For example, it is plausible that a manufacturer
may assign more platforms to exible plants (because they can better manage the additional
variety). This suggests a negative correlation between !p(i) and NPLATF. As we have
already discussed, a manufacturer may choose a higher cost markup for a popular product,
which suggests that COSTMK and i can be negatively correlated. The popularity of a
model may also inuence a manufacturers decision regarding the number of options to o¤er,
but it is not clear if this leads to more or to fewer options. The inclusion of additional controls
to the model can mitigate this endogeneity bias, which we now discuss.
In our analysis, we study several specications which include di¤erent levels of control
variables. The following control variables are included in all of the specications analyzed.
The regressions include year indicators to control for the random component  t. They also
include make and segment controls, which partially control for cross-sectional variation in
model popularity (captured in i). We used the following four-segment classication pub-
lished by Wards: (i) sport cars; (ii) all other cars; (iii) Sport/Utility and Cross/Utility Vehi-
cles (SUV); and (iv) minivans. To control for unobserved changes in model popularity across
the product life-cycle (which is captured in it), we include two indicators, INTRODUM and
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ENDDUM, in the rst and last year a model is produced16. To control for di¤erences in
replenishment leadtime, we include indicators of plant location (Mexico, Canada and U.S.)
as well as a control if the model has some imported production.
Our rst specication includes model indicators to control for i. This is equivalent to
xed e¤ect (FE) estimation, which exploits only the variation within each model across
time. Model indicators do not entirely control for time-invariant plant unobservables, !p(i),
because some models change their production across plants on di¤erent years. Hence, in the
FE specications, the estimation of  still relies on cross-sectional variation across plants.
The same applies to PS, which varies considerably across models produced in di¤erent plants.
SEASON, which is time-invariant for each model, cannot be estimated with FE. We note
that DEALERS is make-specic, hence this e¤ect is estimated with variation across time
only (in this, as well as the other specications). The within make variation in the number of
dealerships is low (the coe¢ cient of variation is below 10% for most makes), hence we expect
this e¤ect to be estimated with low precision. NMKT is segment specic, so its estimate is
also based on time variation only.
Our second specication is estimated without the model indicators, so it is now possible
to estimate the SEASON e¤ect. Here, we assume strict exogeneity, E
 
uitjXit;Wp(i)t

= 0,
where X and W include all of the controls mentioned previously other than the model
indicators. Given this assumption, the parameters can be estimated consistently using
OLS, but random e¤ects (RE) estimation accounts for the heteroskedastic structure of uit
and provides more e¢ cient estimates. However, we note that FE estimates are consistent
under less restrictive assumptions. More specically, FE is consistent even if the assumptions
E (Xitji) = 0 and E
 
Wp(i)tji

= 0 are relaxed. We use a statistical test (e.g. the Hausman
test) to compare the estimates of these two specications (and the next two) to choose a
preferred one.
The third specication reintroduces the model controls and focuses on the estimation of
PS: In particular, there may be a concern that PS could exhibit a mechanical relationship
with the dependent variable DS: PS is evaluated with monthly inventory changes and DS
is calculated using contemporary inventory data. To address this issue, we instrument PS
using the following instrumental variables: the average PS of other models produced in the
16Days-of-supply in the year a model is introduced could be lower because of higher model popularity
(e.g., a novel product design). Therefore, we expect INTRODUM to have a negative e¤ect. We included
ENDDUM as a control, but do not have an a priori predictions of the directions of its e¤ect. We also
considered further controls for product life-cycle and found no changes in our main results.
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same plant (PS oth), and one-year lags of the models PS and PS oth. These instruments do
not use the same inventory observations, hence cannot be mechanically related to DS. They
explain variation across models produced in di¤erent plants, but they are weak instruments
to explain variation in PS across years within a plant. Hence, this identication strategy is
not feasible when plant controls are included in the model.
Finally, our fourth specications includes model FE and plant indicators to control for
both time-invariant unobservables, i and !p(i). In this specication, both  and  are
estimated using variation across years only.17
We report in Section 6 the results from our four main specications. In Section 6.1 we
analyze other specications including additional controls to test the robustness of the results.
6. Results
Table 2 describes the means of the variables used, grouped by manufacturer, and some other
summary statistics for the models in the sample. (We excluded some outliers from the
sample, which are discussed in detail in Section 6.1.) Consistent with Figure 1, the table
shows that Toyota carries approximately 30 fewer days-of-supply than the sample average.
There are some other notable di¤erences between Toyota and the other makes (primarily
Chrysler, Ford and GM). Toyota has considerably higher sales per model than the other
makes, substantially higher production exibility (measured as a lower PS) and many fewer
dealerships (about 1200 instead of about 3000). However, Toyotas cost markup matches the
mean of the entire sample, and they are not remarkably distinctive in terms of the number of
options o¤ered per model, the number of platforms produced per plant, or plant utilization.
The online appendix includes a table of correlations between the variables.
The main results are reported in Table 3. All the specications estimate equation (1)
(shown at the top of the table), but they di¤er in the identication strategy used, as discussed
in the previous section. The bottom of the table shows whether model or plant controls (or
both) are included, the number of observations, the number of models and the R-square
of each regression. For the specication estimated without model controls (column (b)),
the table reports the overall R-square; for the others, the within R-square is reported. To
ease visualization, we do not report on the controls for year, plant location, whether the
model has imports, and the INTRO and END dummy variables. Recall, the dependent
17For models produced in more than one plant, multiple plant indicators are set equal to one.
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and independent variables are included with log transformation, so the coe¢ cients can be
interpreted as elasticities.
Column (a) reports the estimates using FE. The signs of all the point estimates are consis-
tent with theoretical predictions (except UTIL, where theory is ambiguous, and STREND+,
which is positive and not signicant), but not all the coe¢ cients are di¤erent from zero with
statistical signicance. To evaluate the economic signicance of these results, we calculated
the e¤ect of increasing the value of the covariates one standard deviation above the mean.
The number of dealerships, DEALERS, has the largest economic impactan increase in this
factor raises DS by 21%. Increasing PS raises DS by 8%. The e¤ect of increasing NMKT
is 9%, and raising COSTMK increases inventory by 6%. The e¤ect of raising UTIL is 5%,
and the impact of the remaining variables is below 4%.
Column (b) shows the estimates using RE, which does not control for time-invariant
unobservable di¤erences across models. Instead, it includes indicators for make and segment
to partially control for these unobservables. (Make and segment are controlled via the model
indicators in the other specications.) The coe¢ cients in columns (a) and (b) are similar
with a few exceptions. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient on COSTMK reduces its magnitude
and becomes not statistically distinguishable from zero. The coe¢ cient on SALES increases
in magnitude and is negative with statistical signicance. A Hausman test rejects the null
hypothesis that the estimates of columns (a) and (b) are equal (p-value less than 0.01), and
so the strict exogeneity assumption E (Xitjit) = 0 and E (Witjit) = 0 is rejected by the
data. A single coe¢ cient t-test on the equality of the COSTMK or SALES coe¢ cients
also rejects the null. These results are consistent with our conjecture about the confounding
e¤ect of model popularity, as discussed previously: popular models tend to have higher
sales and markups, while at the same time tend to have lower inventories for other reasons,
possibly because customers are more willing to wait to purchase a popular model when it is
out of stock rather than substitute to another product. Consequently, the empirical evidence
suggests that controlling for model popularity is important to get consistent estimates of the
direct e¤ect of cost markup and sales volume on inventory.
Column (c) uses instrumental variables to address a possible mechanical correlation be-
tween PS and the dependent variable. Because the instruments include the PS of other
models produced in the same plant and lagged values of PS, the sample size in this specica-
tion is smaller.18 The standard errors increase substantially for the estimated PS coe¢ cient,
18The sample excludes plants producing a single model and the rst year in which a model is produced at
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but the point estimate is similar in magnitude to (a) and signicant at the 10% condence
level. The other coe¢ cients do not change much. We estimated specication (a) over the
same sample and used a Hausman test to compare the estimates. The test cannot reject
that the estimates are equal. Therefore, the statistical evidence suggests that the positive
e¤ect of PS is not driven by a mechanical relationship with DS.
Column (d) includes indicators for both model and plant. Notice how the coe¢ cient on
NPLATF increases in magnitude and becomes signicant. This provides some evidence that
an increase in the number of platforms produced at a plant raises the days-of-supply of the
models produced by the plant. The di¤erence in the estimated coe¢ cient for NPLATF from
(a) and (d) is moderately statistically signicant (p-value=.09). The other coe¢ cients are
similar in magnitude and statistical signicance. This suggests that the potential bias due to
unobserved plant capabilities is not large (given the controls included in our specications).
Based on the statistical analysis, we choose (a) as our preferred specication. Specica-
tion (b) is rejected against (a), suggesting that model FE are important to control for un-
observable model characteristics such as model popularity. Specication (c), which corrects
for potential mechanical correlation between PS and DS, yields similar results compared to
(a), but the estimates of (a) are more precise. The estimates in (d) are also similar, but
model (a) is more parsimonious. In Section 6.1 we conduct additional analysis showing the
robustness of the estimates of specication (a). Hence, we focus the analysis and discussion
on the results provided by this specication.
The results suggests that the e¤ect of plant utilization, UTIL, is positive and signicant.
There are multiple explanations for this e¤ect; we defer the discussion of these explanations
to Section 6.2. We also nd that the number of models o¤ered in a segment, NMKT, has a
positive and signicant e¤ect on inventory, suggesting that increasing competition induces
rms to carry higher inventories.
Our results suggest that the e¤ect of models sales volume (SALES) is not statistically
signicant. However, we do nd that increasing the number of options in which a model is of-
fered (OPTIONS) increases inventory. The magnitude of this type of demand fragmentation
is small relative to the e¤ect of increasing the number of dealerships.
We nd some evidence that sales trends a¤ect inventory levels. Negative sales trends
(STREND-) are associated with higher inventory levels, but positive sales trends (STREND+)
a plant (which can be a new model or an exisiting model switching production between plants).
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have no e¤ect on inventory. The e¤ect of STREND- could be capturing low model popularity
or lags in reducing production capacity.
The e¤ect of the number of dealerships (DEALERS) is found to be large, but the co-
e¢ cient estimate has a large standard error. Recall that this factor is estimated using
longitudinal variation in the dealership network, which is relatively low during the 9 years
covered in this study. A more precise estimation of this e¤ect would require additional time-
series data or a di¤erent empirical strategy (e.g. using variation in the dealership network
across geographic regions).
We used the estimates to examine how much of the di¤erence in inventory between Toy-
ota and Chrysler, Ford and GM is explained by DEALERS and PS. We focus in these two
factors because they are economically signicant and substantially di¤erent across manu-
facturers (see Table 2). Table 4 shows the adjusted days-of-supply for the three domestic
manufacturers from setting DEALERS and PS to the average levels of Toyota, and the
implied reduction in annual inventory costs. Inventory cost are calculated based on a 20%
annual holding cost, $15 thousand cost per vehicle and average annual sales of each manufac-
turer. We also report the marginal e¤ect of each factor and the 95% condence interval for
the adjusted days-of-supply. Recall from Table 1 that the average DS of Toyota is 38. The
results suggest that the number of dealerships (DEALERS) and our measure of production
exibility (PS) explain almost all of the di¤erence in days-of-supply between Toyota and
Chrysler, Ford and GM.
6.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Several regression diagnostics were conducted to analyze the robustness of the results. Resid-
uals vs. tted scatter plots did not exhibit any systematic trend, so heteroskedasticity is
not considered an issue. We found a few outliers in the data, but these are not inuential
points in the estimation. Excluding any observation from the data does not change any of
the estimated coe¢ cients by more than half its standard error, suggesting that the main
results are not driven by inuential points.
We tested alternative specications to validate our results. (Estimation results of these
alternative specications are available from the authors upon request.) We estimated (a)
without log transformations and found small di¤erences in our results. NMKT and DEAL-
ERS are positive but not signicant. The R-square is 0.3, lower than the one obtained in
the log-log specication (0.38).
17
Four models in our sample include some imported production19. We excluded the model-
years that included imports and found no signicant change in our results. We also estimated
specication (a) excluding models in their introduction year and found no changes in the main
results. Recall from section 4 that our main results exclude observations from Oldsmobile in
2000-2004 and all Suzuki models due to their dramatic change in the number of dealerships.
When including these observations in the analysis, the coe¢ cient of DEALERS increases in
magnitude and statistical signicance.
Demand for more fuel-e¢ cient vehicles increased during our sample period, possibly
related to the almost 100% increase in oil prices from 1999 to 2004. To control for changes
in demand across vehicle segments, we included segment-specic year controls and found no
changes in our results.
We estimated specication (a) using alternative measures of DS as the dependent vari-
able, based on average sales rate of one and three months ahead (instead of two months
ahead). We found no change in our results, and the R-square of these specications are also
similar.
COSTMK is estimated from the data and subject to measurement error. We estimated
specications similar to (a) and (b) replacing COSTMK by the list price of the standard
model (PRICE). In the FE regression, the coe¢ cient on PRICE is .013 and not signi-
cant. In the RE regression, the coe¢ cient is -0.12 and statistically signicant. This change
in magnitude provides further evidence of the confounding e¤ect of model popularity. In
both regressions, all the other coe¢ cients were similar in magnitude and statistical signi-
cance. This suggests that the measurement error in COSTMK does not bias the estimated
coe¢ cients of the other covariates.
Our results suggest that including model FE is useful to control for unobserved model
popularity to get consistent estimates of the e¤ect of COSTMK on inventory performance.
But if model popularity changes across time, then model FE do not control completely for
this confounding e¤ect. To test this, a proxy that captures longitudinal variation in model
popularity is needed. Consumer Reports provides model ratings based on customer surveys.
We included two of the measures published by Consumer Reports. The rst measure is a
rating from 1 to 5 based on test drives, 3 been the average rating for the segment and 5 the
19These include COROLLA after year 2001, and all the model-years of ACCORD, CAMRY and MAXIMA;
a total of 15 observations.
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highest rating20. The second measure is an indicator on whether the model was recommended
or not. This recommendation takes into account predicted reliability (based on previous
survey data) in addition to the product rating. Note that not all the models are rated each
year, so the size of this sample is smaller21. For comparison, we estimated specication
(a) using the Consumer Reports sub-sample. Adding the consumer report variables does
not change the estimated coe¢ cients. The coe¢ cients of the consumer report variables are
small and not signicant. This suggests that model FE provide good controls for product
popularity.
Specication (d) in Table 3 includes plant indicators to control for unobserved plant
capabilities. These controls are weak if plant capabilities changed substantially over time.
PS captures possible changes in exibility over time, but we also included additional proxies
for plant exibility to validate our results. We obtained weekly data on work stoppages for
all Chrysler, GM and Ford plants, published in Automotive News. Details of these data are
described in Bresnahan and Ramey (1994).22 From these data, we calculated the number of
days that each plant was closed due to model changeovers (MODCHG). If a plant becomes
more exible by reducing switching times, it should be reected in fewer plant closings
(lower MODCHG). We estimated (a) with this additional variable. Because the sample size
is smaller, DEALERS is no longer signicant. All other estimates were similar to (a).
The specications in Table 4 include models that were produced at more than one plant.
For those models, Wp(i)t represent average plant e¤ects, calculated by taking the weighted
mean of all plants that produced the model. To see whether this a¤ected our results, we re-
estimated specication (a) limiting the sample to models that had at least 70% of its domestic
production from a single plant and included the data from that plant only in the model (the
sample size reduces to 545 observations). All results were similar with two exceptions.
SALES becomes more negative (-0.08) and statistically signicant at the 10% condence
level. The coe¢ cient on NPLATF is 0.08 and moderately signicant (p-value<0.1). In
this specication, the Wp(i)t covariates are measured more precisely, which could explain the
higher statistical signicance of NPLATF.
20Consumer Report classication of vehicles includes more segments then the four we use, decomposing
the car and SUV segments into multiple groups (luxury, middle/large size, etc).
21The sample of Consumer Reports models tends to include higher selling vehicles than in the base sample
(122 versus 104 thousand vehicles).
22We thank Valery Ramey and Daniel Vine for providing the dataset used in their study, which includes
plant closures up to 2001. We completed their dataset by collecting data from some missing plants (located
in Mexico) and from years 2002-2004.
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The results in Table 3 provide some evidence that the number of platforms produced at
a plant a¤ects DS, but the e¤ect seems to be small. We want to test the robustness of this
result with other measures of fundamental variety. A new measure was dened based on
Wards platform classication, which is di¤erent from Harbours platform denitions.23 We
estimated specication (a) using this measure instead of NPLATF. The coe¢ cient on the
new measure is 0.01 with a standard error of 0.03 (and not statistically signicant).
6.2 Discussion
Our two main ndings are (1) fragmenting demand across more dealerships, DEALERS ; is
associated with higher days-of-supply and (2) greater production exibility, as measured by
the exhibited ability for production to track closely with sales, PS, is associated with lower
days-of-supply. This section discusses those results as well as other issues regarding our
study.
The DEALERS e¤ect is of large magnitude and signicant. However, it is also measured
with a large standard error, which we believe is due to the limited variation in the number of
dealerships across most makes over time. (Note, we control for di¤erences across models, so
DEALERS is not estimated with cross-sectional data.) Twomakes did exhibit a considerable
amount of variation, Oldsmobile and Suzuki, but we chose to exclude them from the analysis
because their changes in DS may be due to reasons other than the shift in the number of
dealerships. For example, Oldsmobile may have reduced its DS because it was phasing out
the brand even if it was also maintaining the same number of dealerships. Furthermore,
although we are able to identify an important e¤ect regarding the dealership network, we are
unable able to identify the precise mechanism by which the number of dealerships is related
to DS: For example, it is possible that increasing the number of dealerships leads each
dealership to have more variable demand, thereby requiring each dealer to carry a higher
DS to maintain the same service level (such as a ll rate target or in-stock probability).
Alternatively, increasing the number of dealerships may increase the amount of competition
the brand faces because the new dealerships will be closer to existing dealerships from the
same brand as well as dealerships from other brands. Theory is ambiguous on the impact of
competition on inventory, but some models suggest that increased competition can increase
23Wards assigns more than one platform to some models during a calendar year. For example, they
considered several platforms for the Toyota Camry, so that the rst half of a calendar year the Camry was
produced in one platform and on the second half, after the model change-over, on another platform. This
suggests that their platform classication is more sensitive to minor changes in the model specications.
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a rms optimal inventory. Therefore, we cannot distinguish with our data if the DEALERS
e¤ect is due to demand fragmentation or increased competition or a combination of both.
Interestingly, our other measures of demand fragmentation do not suggest a strong e¤ect.
For example, we did not nd a signicant economies of scale (DS is not associated with higher
or lower sales per model), and the e¤ect of the number of options o¤ered for the model is
small (but still statistically signicant). It is possible that economies of scale are adequately
captured by our other controls. For example, if PS is removed from the regression, the
e¤ect of SALES increases in magnitude and becomes signicant. The option e¤ect may be
small due to conicting forces: adding options may fragment demand and make demand
more variable, but product di¤erentiation o¤ers better match to heterogeneous customer
preferences, making each option more popular and thereby require less inventory. (See
Cachon et al. (2006) for a model of some of these e¤ects.) Furthermore, there is evidence in
the literature that the number of options may not have a strong e¤ect on production (Fisher
and Ittner (1999)).
We also nd an important association between our proxy of production exibility, PS;
and our dependent variable, DS: PS measures inventory volatility and we suggest that
more exible plants generate less inventory volatility because they are able to better match
their production to their demand. Furthermore, we suggest that inventory volatility can
vary independently of the average inventory level but rms with lower inventory volatility
tend to carry less inventory, possibly because their lower inventory volatility enables them to
choose to operate with lower safety stocks. Consistent with a connection between PS and
production exibility, we nd a higher correlation between the PS of models produced at
the same plant than between models in the same segment. However, we acknowledge that
a concern can remain that there exists a mechanical relationship between PS and DS:
Hence, we estimated a specication using instrumental variables for which there cannot
be a mechanical relationship between DS and PS (e.g., we use the PS of other models
produced at the same plant to instrument for a models PS): We continue to observe this
relationship with this specication, which provides additional support for our hypotheses
that PS proxies for production exibility. Furthermore, PS appears to be capturing a
measure of production exibility beyond just the number of platforms produced at a plant,
NPLATF, or the aggregate scale of production, SALES. However, with our data we are
unable to identify the specic mechanism that enables one models production to track sales
more closely than another models production. For example, PS could reect lower switching
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times or more exible labor, among other possible sources of production exibility.
We nd that higher cost markups are associated with higher inventory, which provides
evidence of the direct e¤ect of markups on shortage costs. However, our econometric analy-
sis also suggests that unobservable model characteristics (such as model popularity) can
confound the direct e¤ect of markups on inventory. Popular models tend to have higher
markups, but may also have lower inventories because customers are more willing to wait for
the product. Hence, a regression that does not include controls for model popularity may
underestimate the direct positive e¤ect of cost markups on inventory. This appears to be
an important issue for the auto industry and may be relevant for other industries as well.
Our results suggest that models produced at highly utilized plants have higher inventories.
Two alternative explanations are consistent with this nding. The rst one is that highly
utilized plants may have longer production leadtimes, which leads to higher safety stocks.
The second explanation is related to xed plant production capacity. In plants producing
more than one product with a cyclic schedule, switching times reduce e¤ective capacity
available for production. To meet an increase in demand with xed capacity, plants need
to schedule longer production cycles, which increases production lot sizes and utilization
(because production volume increases and capacity is xed). Consequently, higher plant
utilization is associated with higher inventory levels. Since we do not have data on production
leadtimes and lot sizes, we cannot identify these two e¤ects separately.
We also nd that competition, measured by the number of models o¤ered in the same
segment, has a positive e¤ect on inventory. When more substitutes are available, customers
may be less prone to wait for a product that is out of stock. Consequently, stronger com-
petition could make stock-outs more costly to a rm, leading to higher target service levels
(and thereby higher inventories) to reduce the frequency of stock-outs.
7. Conclusion
We report substantial and persistent di¤erences in nished-goods inventory levels in the U.S.
auto industry: data on days-of-supply suggest that Toyotas well documented advantage in
manufacturing e¢ ciency and upstream supply chain management extends to their nished
goods supply chain downstream from their assembly plants to their dealerships. We identify
and measure the e¤ect of several factors on nished-goods inventory in this industry. We nd
that two of these factors, production exibility and the number of dealerships, explains most
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of the di¤erence in inventory between Toyota and Chrysler, Ford and GM. (Although we use
Toyota for our benchmark for comparisons, our qualitative results are similar for Honda.)
Production exibility allows a rm to track production more closely to sales, thereby yielding
a lower optimal level of safety stock for a rm. Fewer dealerships allows a rm to pool
demand in fewer locations and to reduce both intra brand and inter-brand competition,
either of which or both could lead to a lower optimal inventory level. Furthermore, we nd
the dealership e¤ect to be the most inuential: e.g., this factor alone explains more than
75% of the di¤erence in inventory between Toyota and GM.
While it is debatable whether other manufacturers can emulate Toyotas skill at pro-
duction exibility, it is clear that it will be di¢ cult for rms like the established domestic
producers to match Toyotas advantage in terms of its dealership network. Chrysler, Ford
and GM established their dealership networks in the rst half of the 20th century, before the
inter-state highway system and at a time when the U.S. was more rural. As a result, they
created many dealerships so that consumers need not travel far to reach a dealer. Toyota
(and other later entrants to the U.S. market, like Honda) did not need to open nearly as
many dealerships because as transportation became easier, consumers were willing to travel
farther (or did not need to travel as far with increased urbanization). Furthermore, because
the franchise laws in most states impose stringent requirements on the opening and closing
of dealerships, rms like GM are unable to easily change their dealership network, either the
number of dealerships or their locations. For example, during the phase-out of the Oldsmo-
bile brand during 2001-2004, GM spent more than $1 billion reimbursing dealers for forgone
prots and equipment (Welch (2006)); and Ford attempted to consolidate dealerships in local
markets, but they found the legal barriers to be insurmountable (Warner (1998)). Thus, it
appears that Toyota has a competitive advantage in the U.S. with respect to nished-goods
inventory that cannot easily be eliminated.
Although our results may appear to argue for more exibility in franchise laws, we caution
against such a quick conclusion. Changes in those laws should be based, at least in part, on
how they would e¤ect consumer welfare and our results suggest conicting e¤ects. Consumer
welfare should increase if there is more inventory available to choose from, but it is not clear
how increasing the number of dealerships will inuence availability: holding the sale rate
constant, our results suggest that days-of-supply will increase, which should increases the
absolute number of vehicles at dealerships; but an increase in dealerships could lower the
sales per dealership, which, holding the days-of-supply constant, could lead to fewer vehicles
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available to consumers. Furthermore, more dealerships should increase price competition,
which is benecial to consumers, but more dealerships also raises inventory carrying costs,
which harms consumer welfare. Therefore, a detailed analysis of the magnitude of these
e¤ects is needed before a clear recommendation can be made regarding changes to franchise
laws.
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Figure 1 – Inventory of three auto manufacturers. Days-of-supply is calculated as the 
aggregate inventory at the end of each month divided by the average daily sales rate in 
the following two months. Inventory includes all finished vehicles in US territory, 
including inventory in the plant, in ports of entry, in transit to dealers and in dealerships. 
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Figure 2 – Theoretical factors affecting days of supply. 
 
 
Covariate  Definition Factors 
NMKT # of models in the same segment Competition 
COSTMK  Estimated cost markup Cost markup, model popularity 
SALES Average monthly sales Demand fragmentation (-), 
model popularity 
OPTIONS # of model options Demand fragmentation 
DEALERS # of dealerships Demand fragmentation, customer 
propensity to wait (-) 
NPLATF  # of platforms produced in plant  Production switching times, 
production flexibility 
PS  Average difference of production and sales 
(equation (4)) 
Production flexibility (-) 
SEASON  Seasonal variation (equation (3)) Seasonality, model popularity (-)
UTIL  Total plant production divided by capacity Plant utilization 
STREND+ Positive sales trend (equation (2a)) Positive sales trend, model 
popularity 
STREND- Negative sales trend (equation (2b)) Positive sales trend (-), model 
popularity (-) 
 
Table 1 – Summary of the covariates included in the econometric analysis. A negative 
sign (-) after the factor name indicates an inverse relationship between the factor and the 
variable. For example, higher PS implies lower production flexibility. 
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Chrysler  69  9147  620  660 2884 6.16 0.68 76 0.40  1.18  0.21 0.16
Ford  74  10499  411  839 3056 6.44 0.69 89 0.38  1.53  0.22 0.14
GM  77  7611  648  562 3075 4.80 0.63 85 0.36  1.37  0.25 0.15
Honda  45  12949  762  206 582 4.70 0.60 104 0.41  1.30  0.19 0.12
Nissan  80  7725  448  417 1076 4.15 0.62 78 0.36  1.54  0.25 0.15
Toyota  38  16473  879  1169 1197 4.87 0.65 100 0.42  1.27  0.13 0.12
mean  72  9066  587  653 2685 5.43 0.65 86 0.37  1.39  0.23 0.15
sd  24  7982  1388  1202 1177 4.54 0.10 41 0.11  0.67  0.11 0.05
min  13  281  0  0 258 1.00 0.23 11 0.06  1.00  0.06 0.07
max  197  37347  14540  16376 4420 38.00 1.02 124 0.64  4.00  1.03 0.32
 
Table 2 – Summary statistics (variables measured without log transformation). The 
means of the variables are also reported separately for the six major manufacturers. 
Model:   ???? ? ???? ? ??????? ? ??? 
 
     (a)    (b)    (c )    (d) 
SALES  ‐0.016  ‐0.105**  ‐0.001  ‐0.054 
(0.040)  (0.024)  (0.047)  (0.045) 
STREND‐  0.019**  0.016*  ‐0.002  0.019** 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
STREND+  0.005  0.002  ‐0.015*  0.006 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
DEALERS  0.528*  0.483*  0.699**  0.452* 
(0.207)  (0.210)  (0.237)  (0.218) 
OPTIONS  0.058*  0.072**  0.016  0.057* 
(0.024)  (0.021)  (0.026)  (0.025) 
COSTMK  0.439**  0.191^  0.311^  0.554** 
(0.154)  (0.110)  (0.171)  (0.162) 
NMKT  0.220**  0.213**  0.266**  0.189* 
(0.071)  (0.065)  (0.086)  (0.079) 
UTIL  0.178**  0.129**  0.211**  0.226** 
(0.041)  (0.035)  (0.046)  (0.045) 
NPLATF  0.047  0.073*  0.047  0.088^ 
(0.042)  (0.033)  (0.054)  (0.052) 
PS  0.194**  0.218**  0.213^  0.175** 
(0.027)  (0.026)  (0.111)  (0.027) 
SEASON  0.216** 
(0.056) 
Model controls  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Plant controls  No  No  No  Yes 
# obs  705  705  600  705 
# models  133  133  122  133 
R‐squared  0.39  0.60  0.37  0.44 
 
Table 3 – Main estimation results. Standard errors showed between parentheses. All the 
covariates are included with log transformation. Column (c) uses instrumental variables 
to instrument for PS (using PS of other models produced at the same plant and lagged 
values of PS as instrumental variables). Column (b) is estimated with RE; all other 
specifications are estimated with model FE. Column (d) also includes plant indicators. ^,* 
and ** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels, 
respectively.  
 
 
   Days of 
Supply 
% reduction in days‐of‐supply Adjusted Days of Supply Inv. Cost 
Reduction M$ Manuf.  PS  DEALERS  Estimate  95% CI 
                    
Chrysler  69  7.9%  35.6%  41  [ 27  ,  55]  $402  
Ford  74  9.2%  37.4%  42  [ 27  ,  58]  $638  
GM  78  11.6%  37.3%  43  [ 28  ,  60]  $957  
 
Table 4 - Reduction in days-of-supply and inventory costs (in million $ per year) for 
Chrysler, Ford and GM from adjusting production flexibility (PS) and the number of 
dealerships (DEALERS) to the average levels of Toyota. For adjusted days-of-supply, the 
point estimate and 95% confidence interval (CI) are reported. Inventory costs were 
calculated based on $15,000 cost per vehicle and 20% annual holding cost. 
ONLINE APPENDIX
Estimation of the Cost Markups
We used the methodology described in Berry et. al.(1995) (hereon BLP) to estimate
markups for each model on each year. We briey outline this methodology and refer inter-
ested readers to the original articles for details.
This methodology forms part of a broad class of econometric models known as structural
estimation. Assuming a theoretical model of decision making, this approach attempts
to impute the parameters of the decision model that best t the observed data. In our
application, following BLP, we assume the U.S. automotive industry is an oligopoly where
auto prices are determined through Bertrand/Nash equilibrium in a di¤erentiated product
market. If we knew the complete specication of demand for automobiles and the marginal
costs of manufacturing each car, then we could compute the equilibrium sales and prices (and
therefore the markups) for each model. Structural estimation follows the reverse approach.
Given the equilibrium prices and market shares observed in the data, we estimate the costs
and demand parameters that are consistent with this equilibrium under the maintained
behavioral assumption of the agents in the market.
Let pj and cj be the price and (constant) marginal cost of model j in a specic market.
Let Jf be the set of models o¤ered by rm f . Demand is dened by the function Dj (~p; ~x)
which species the total demand of product j as a function of the vector of prices ~p and the
vector of characteristics ~x of all the products o¤ered in the market. The prot function for
rm f is given by:
f =
X
j2Jf
(pj   cj)Dj (~p; ~x)  Fixed Costsj
Denote byM the total market size and sj (~p; ~x) = Dj (~p; ~x) =M the market share of model j.
Under Nash equilibrium in prices, the equilibrium price vector ~p and market share vector
~s must satisfy:
~s +
X
r2Jf
(pr   cr)
@sr (~p
; ~x)
@pj
= 0 (1)
for all models j in the market. Denote the equilibrium markup of model j by bj = p

j   cj:
Let b be the stacked vector of these markups and dene the matrix  of price substitutions
by jr = @sr=@pr if product j and r are produced by the same rm, and jr = 0 otherwise.
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Equation (1) can be rewritten in matrix form as:
b =  1s (2)
where b and s are the stacked vectors of markups and market shares, respectively.
Equation (2) species the markups as a function of the price substitutions and the equi-
librium market shares. Therefore, if we knew , we could compute the markups using the
observed market shares, assuming these quantities were reached through the Nash equilib-
rium in prices described above. The matrix  is dened by: (i) the set of models produced
by each rm, which we observe in the data; and (ii) the price substitutions @sj=@pr;which
we do not observe directly. Therefore, in order to compute the markups, we need to estimate
demand in the auto industry. As summarized by Nevo (2000), researchers face two main
di¢ culties in estimating demand for di¤erentiated products: (i) the number of substitu-
tions to be estimated increases in the square of the number of products; and (ii) prices are
endogenous and tend to be correlated with unobserved product quality.
To overcome the rst problem, BLP uses a random-coe¢ cient multinomial logit which
incorporates unobserved heterogeneity in consumer tastes for product attributes, allowing
for exible substitution patterns in the data. To overcome the second problem, BLP uses
instrumental variables. Valid instruments for price are cost shifters and the characteristics
of other products available in the market.
We estimated demand using data from 1996 to 2004. We dened the U.S. market sales
for a given year as our market, giving a total of 9 markets. As in BLP, we used the number
of households in the U.S. as our size of the market. We included all car models, all SUVs
and CUVs and minivans. We excluded pickups and full size vans from the analysis. In
addition to prices, we included random coe¢ cients for the following product characteristics:
(i) car size (the product of the length and width of the vehicle); (ii) a measure of acceleration
(horsepower divided by weight); (iii) Miles per dollar of gasoline (based on EPA Miles per
gallon measures and the average price of gasoline during the year); (iv) a measure of security
(the sum of the indicators on whether the base model has airbags and Automatic Break Sys-
tem); and (v) indicators on market segment (whether the auto was classied in the following
non-overlapping segments: cars, sport cars, SUV and minivan). We let the price coe¢ cient
interact with personal income, which was drawn from a lognormal distribution. The median
income varies across years and was obtained from CPS. All dollar values are normalized to
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1982-83 dollars using the CPI. We included non-random coe¢ cients in the demand side to
control for brand (Ford, GM, Chrysler, Honda, Toyota, Nissan, other European brands and
other Asian brands). We added two measures based on the ratings from Consumer Reports:
a dummy to indicate whether the model was recommended and a dummy on whether the
product was rated above average. On the supply side, we included all the product char-
acteristics (without the brand dummies nor the Consumer Report variables) plus a trend.
We added variables indicating the percentage of production coming from plants in the U.S.,
Canada and Mexico and from overseas1. We did not include wages and exchange rates in
the cost side as in BLP.
Our implementation was based on the source code provided by Nevo (2000). We modied
the source code to include the supply equation into the estimation. We also added routines
to compute the optimal instruments described in BLP. Both the supply side and the use of
optimal instruments improved signicantly the precision of our coe¢ cient estimates. Overall,
our results are consistent with those obtained in BLP, especially in the estimation of the price
elasticities and cross-substitutions.
Table A3 provides a sample of the estimated markups for di¤erent years. The markups
look reasonable both in absolute magnitude and in relative comparison across models. Main-
streamcars, such as the Honda Accord, the Toyota Camry and the Ford Taurus tend to have
smaller markups, while Sport models (Porsche 911), SUVs (Chevy Suburban) and expen-
sive luxury vehicles (Mercedes E Class and Jaguar XJ6) tend to have larger markups. Even
though the markups are increasing with the price of a vehicle, markups and cost markups are
not proportional. Note also that some models exhibit unreasonable markups. For example,
the Mini Cooper exhibits very low markups because we do not capture specic attributes of
these exclusive models in our product characteristics. The sports car segment also exhibits
particularly low cost markup. We also observe that there is some variation in the markups
across time within a model, which is useful to identify the e¤ect of this variable on inventory
performance. Table A4 shows the price semi-elasticities, dened as the percent change in
market share after a $1000 price change, for a sample of models. The table shows that
1 We further classied imports into Europe, Japan and other Asian countries based
on their make. For models that have both domestic and imported production, we aproxi-
mated the percentage of imports by the di¤erence in annual sales and domestic production.
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price changes tend to have the largest e¤ect on products in the same segment2. We also
note that the magnitude of the semi-elasticities di¤er across segments, which suggests that
the propensity to substitute di¤ers across vehicle types. This provides further support for
controlling for market segment in our econometric model.
To validate our cost markup estimates, we calculated the gross prot per vehicle for each
make implied by the model markups and compared it to the dealership gross prot per
vehicle published by Automotive News. If dealerships get a xed proportion of the supply
chain prots and we measure the markups precisely, this two measures should be perfectly
correlated. The correlation between the two measures is 0.8 (approximately). A regression
with dealership prot as the dependent variable and the calculated markups and an intercept
as covariates gives a coe¢ cient of determination (R2) of 0.7, that is, 70% of the variation in
dealership gross prots can be explained by our estimated markups.
2 If the choice model were a standard Multi-nomial logit (MNL) model, all the rows
in this table would then be identical. Therefore, including segment indicators as random
coe¢ cients helps to overcome the restrictions of the MNL.
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ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 
Manufacturer Total 
Domestic 
No. Plants 
Excluded 
Excluded 
Plants 
Products in excluded 
plants 
AM General 2 2 All 
AutoAlliance 1 0 
BMW 2 2 All 
CAMI 1 0 
Chrysler Corp. 16 1 Conner Dodge Viper, Prowler 
Ford N.A. Mfg. 23 0 
General Motors 34 0 
Honda 6 1 Lincoln Odyssey(*), Pilot(*) 
Mercedes Benz 2 2 All 
Mitsubishi 1 0 
Nissan 4 1 Canton Infiniti QX56, Altima(*), 
Armada, Quest, Titan 
NUMMI 2 0 
Subaru 1 1 
Toyota 4 2 Princeton, 
Tijuana 
Sequoia, Sienna(*), 
Tundra, Tacoma 
Volkswagen 1 1 All 
Volvo 1 1 All 
(*) Models were also produced at other plants included in our dataset. 
 
Table A1 - Detail of domestic plants of each manufacturer which do not have data 
available in the Harbour Report.  
 
Manufacturer 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
AM General     0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
AutoAlliance 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 87%
BMW 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
CAMI 58% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 94%
Chrysler Corp. 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 94% 99%
Ford N.A. Mfg. 100% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
General Motors 97% 98% 98% 99% 100% 96% 96% 95% 95% 97%
Honda 81% 79% 79% 71% 66% 64% 73% 70% 67% 72%
Mercedes Benz 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Mitsubishi 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 66%
Nissan 75% 70% 62% 64% 55% 50% 55% 55% 45% 57%
NUMMI 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 100% 100% 100%
Subaru 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Toyota 100% 100% 100% 92% 84% 78% 79% 68% 61% 82%
Volkswagen 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Volvo 0% 0% 0%      0%
TOTAL 91% 92% 92% 92% 91% 88% 89% 87% 85% 90%
 
Table A2 – Percentage of total domestic production covered by our sample, by 
manufacturer by year.  
 
 
 
 
 
Model
Avg 
Markup
Avg 
CostMk 2001 2002 2003 2004
ACCENT 3.964 62% 65% 66% 71% 55%
NEON (DODGE) 4.666 54% 56% 57% 58% 56%
SENTRA 4.930 58% 57% 58% 60% 58%
CIVIC 5.079 63% 63% 64% 67% 65%
FOCUS 5.433 68% 75% 63% 66% 63%
ESCORT 5.503 68% 61% 74%
MINI COOPER 6.118 54% 55% 53% 55%
GOLF 6.219 61% 62% 60% 62% 61%
RAV4 7.174 65% 63% 61% 63% 55%
CAMARO 7.304 61% 58% 59%
STRATUS SEDAN 7.464 67% 69% 68% 69% 66%
ACCORD 7.470 65% 67% 67% 62% 61%
MALIBU 7.477 66% 62% 61% 66% 75%
CAMRY 8.115 69% 74% 63% 66% 64%
SEBRING COUPE 8.277 65% 68% 69% 68% 66%
IMPALA 8.720 68% 67% 66% 69% 70%
MONTE CARLO 8.731 68% 66% 65% 66% 68%
CORVETTE 8.970 26% 27% 25% 24% 25%
TAURUS 9.097 77% 77% 76% 77% 72%
CARAVAN 9.928 92% 98% 99% 103% 85%
SAAB 9-3 10.278 56% 56% 54% 60% 56%
ENVOY 10.539 54% 53% 53% 56%
VOLVO 60 10.773 61% 59% 59% 60% 65%
EXPLORER 10.793 75% 73% 72% 75% 68%
WINDSTAR PASS 10.959 83% 84% 81% 82%
CHRYSLER 300M 11.471 57% 58% 55% 56%
GRAND CHEROKEE 11.561 65% 66% 64% 64% 61%
TOWN & COUNTRY 12.169 75% 84% 77% 79% 81%
CHEVY SUBURBAN 12.863 69% 64% 63% 64% 68%
VIPER 12.981 20% 25% 25% 24% 25%
AUDI A6 14.434 61% 61% 58% 59% 61%
MERCEDES M CLASS 15.098 63% 64% 64% 64% 60%
BMW X5 15.913 63% 64% 63% 61% 62%
BMW 5 SERIES 16.657 65% 64% 63% 65% 69%
LEXUS GS300 17.201 63% 63% 62% 62% 62%
ACURA RL 18.546 65% 65% 63% 64% 63%
MERCEDES E CLASS 20.389 70% 67% 67% 67% 65%
JAGUAR XJ6/8 23.897 62% 62% 61% 64% 59%
PORSCHE 911 27.286 59% 62% 57% 61% 62%
Table A3 – Estimated markups (price – cost) and cost markups (markup/cost). Markups 
are in thousand dollars of 2004. 
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1
ACCENT -27.49% 0.44% 0.29% 0.46% 0.62% 0.19% 0.16% 0.07% 0.07% 0.13% 0.06% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00%
CIVIC 0.06% -19.79% 0.35% 0.36% 0.27% 0.28% 0.25% 0.08% 0.14% 0.12% 0.07% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00%
CAVALIER 0.07% 0.56% -19.72% 0.39% 0.27% 0.31% 0.28% 0.08% 0.14% 0.13% 0.07% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00%
ACCORD 0.05% 0.29% 0.20% -13.87% 0.50% 0.21% 0.19% 0.10% 0.10% 0.17% 0.09% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00%
CAMRY 0.06% 0.20% 0.12% 0.45% -13.83% 0.14% 0.13% 0.08% 0.05% 0.18% 0.09% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00%
MALIBU 0.03% 0.33% 0.23% 0.30% 0.22% -13.28% 0.23% 0.08% 0.14% 0.13% 0.07% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00%
TAURUS 0.03% 0.31% 0.22% 0.29% 0.22% 0.25% -12.48% 0.08% 0.14% 0.13% 0.07% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00%
SIENNA 0.02% 0.15% 0.10% 0.23% 0.23% 0.13% 0.12% -10.22% 0.64% 0.13% 0.07% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00%
CARAVAN 0.01% 0.18% 0.12% 0.15% 0.10% 0.15% 0.14% 0.42% -9.77% 0.10% 0.05% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00%
EXPLORER 0.02% 0.11% 0.07% 0.19% 0.23% 0.10% 0.10% 0.06% 0.07% -9.69% 0.18% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00%
GRAND CHEROKEE 0.02% 0.11% 0.08% 0.19% 0.22% 0.10% 0.10% 0.06% 0.07% 0.34% -9.60% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00%
VIPER 0.00% 0.07% 0.08% 0.15% 0.08% 0.06% 0.06% 0.05% 0.03% 0.07% 0.05% -6.15% 0.07% 0.07%
MERCEDES E CLASS 0.01% 0.05% 0.03% 0.18% 0.29% 0.06% 0.06% 0.05% 0.04% 0.10% 0.06% 0.00% -5.40% 0.01%
PORSCHE 911 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.09% 0.10% 0.03% 0.03% 0.05% 0.03% 0.06% 0.04% 0.01% 0.08% -3.80%
Table A4 – Estimated price semi-elasticities. Each entry indicates the percent change in sales of the row model after a $1000 change 
in price of the column model (price changes in 2004 dollars). 
 
  
   DS SALES  UTIL PS DEALERS  NMKT  COSTMK  NPLATF STREND+
DS  1.000
SALES  ‐0.133 1.000 
UTIL  ‐0.123 0.293  1.000
PS  0.273 ‐0.232  ‐0.290 1.000
DEALERS  ‐0.115 0.198  0.188 ‐0.151 1.000 
NMKT  0.223 ‐0.023  ‐0.280 0.082 ‐0.239  1.000 
COSTMK  ‐0.034 0.115  0.024 ‐0.079 0.274  ‐0.304  1.000 
NPLATF  0.152 ‐0.129  ‐0.033 0.099 ‐0.140  0.034  ‐0.106  1.000
STREND+  ‐0.002 0.003  0.000 ‐0.013 0.001  ‐0.001  0.001  0.002 1.000
STREND‐  ‐0.008 ‐0.005  0.000 0.010 0.005  ‐0.003  0.003  0.002 ‐0.056
 
Table A5 – Correlation matrix. Shows the correlations within each panel, after controlling 
for model FE. 
 
